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ABSTRACT 
Media coverage of the recent financial crisis has referred extensively to various past 
crises, and in particular to the events of the 1930s. This article suggests that the idea of 
the Great Depression has effectively come to function as a kind of historical ‘black 
mirror’ – a quasi-object within which conjuncture and historical representation 
interact to produce an image of capitalist history itself. Focusing on the journalistic 
output of four key financial publications, I trace how portrayals of the 1930s have 
evolved over the course of the crisis. I find that while the 1930s are frequently and 
consistently invoked in ways that purport to reveal the historicity of the crisis, these 
representations produce an oscillation between different visions of historical repetition, 
which in turn underpin competing interpretations of the crisis as it unfolds. In so 
doing, I argue, appeals to the 1930s have simultaneously served to conceal and disclose 
the constitutive relation of historical imagination to historical process – a double move 
that has had the paradoxical effect of both securing and undermining the reproduction 
of finance capitalism as we have come to know it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When a man or an assembly of men [sic] are in the grip of urgent or perplexing 
circumstances and obliged to take action, their deliberations take less account of 
the present state of things as something that has never happened before, than they do of 
their imaginary ‘memories’. Obeying a sort of law of inertia, uneager to be 
creative or to react inventively to the novelty of the situation, their wavering 
thought tends to behave automatically; it casts around for precedents and yields 
to historical-mindedness which leads it to remember first of all, even when it is a 
question of dealing with some entirely new problem. History feeds upon history.  
(Valéry 1951, p. 13) 
It was with the Great Depression and the outbreak of war behind him that Paul 
Valéry wrote these words, reflecting on how during each of these two episodes, 
European elites had appealed to the past in their attempts to negotiate a radically 
uncertain present. With the advent of a global financial crisis in mid-2007, the world’s 
elites have once again succumbed to the ‘historical-mindedness’ of which Valéry 
wrote, invoking a variety of past crises. Among these, however, it is the Great 
Depression that has emerged as the key reference point, featuring not only in the 
pronouncements of central banks, finance ministries and international economic 
organizations, but also in popular books on global finance, and in the coverage of 
financial newspapers and magazines.  
Of course, this ‘return of the Great Depression’ has not gone unnoticed. 
Within the policy-oriented literature, there is a veritable cottage industry of 
economists seeking to draw the ‘correct’ lessons from the 1930s (for example, see 
Almunia et al. 2010). Meanwhile, in the social sciences more broadly, it has become a 
cliché for scholars to begin their articles on the crisis by acknowledging how everyone 
else has benchmarked it against the events of the 1930s. As yet, though, none have 
addressed the broader meta-historical process to which Valéry alludes – i.e. the 
relation between appeals to the past and efforts to interpret the present. This is a 
shortcoming in need of redress. The return of the Great Depression is quite clearly a 
socio-historical phenomenon in its own right, and when understood in these terms, it 
raises an important question: Exactly which versions of the Great Depression have 
been invoked, and how have these shaped the appearance of the recent global 
financial crisis? 
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On the basis of an empirical investigation into the coverage of the crisis by 
financial newspapers and periodicals, this article suggests that the idea of the Great 
Depression has effectively come to function as a kind of historical ‘black mirror’. In 
the same way that a landscape painter might use a black mirror to reveal the truth of 
Nature, financial journalists have turned to the 1930s in order to reveal the truth of 
History. However, as with the black mirror, this is an image of truth that is necessarily 
shaped by the observer’s positioning and choice of lens.  Building on this metaphor, I 
argue that the Great Depression has acted as a privileged mediator between the 
historical present and visions of historical process as such; and that this mediation has 
taken place through various representations of the 1930s, resulting in different and 
sometimes contradictory visions of historical repetition. Moreover, I suggest that while 
these visions of repetition may appear to have helped save contemporary financial 
capitalism from itself, they have simultaneously served to undermine its ability to 
reproduce a relatively coherent self-image. 
I develop this argument in three stages. First, I introduce the idea of the ‘global 
financial press’ via a brief discussion of the relations between capitalism, media, 
history and finance. Next, I analyze how the 1930s have formed the basis for visions 
of historical repetition in the global financial press, focusing on the 2007-2009 period. 
And finally, I use the black mirror metaphor to offer some reflections on what the 
return of the Great Depression might mean for both historical theory and our 
understanding of the recent crisis. 
CAPITALISM, MEDIA, HISTORY, FINANCE 
The histories of media and capitalism are complex and intertwined.  As a way into 
these, let us begin with Marx’s famous spatial metaphor of base and superstructure. 
On the one hand, information and communication technologies are quite clearly 
implicated in the historical development of different modes of production. Moreover, 
they have been at the heart of those changes that began in the late 1970s, such as the 
resurrection of global finance, the restructuring of corporate and state forms, and the 
creation of new markets for informational and cultural products (Cerny 1994; Castells 
1996). And yet on the other hand, broadcast media have also been involved in the re-
production of corporate and state power since at least the early 1900s, be this through 
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advertising and salesmanship, or news and propaganda (Galbraith 1968; Herman and 
Chomsky 1988). In short, it is possible to situate communicative technologies on either 
side of Classical Marxism’s base-superstructure dualism. 
 But as Raymond Williams points out (1977, pp. 97-99), the concept of 
‘mediation’ – which connotes a general process of communication, rather than the 
form or content of technical media – emerges within Marxist theory in response to the 
perceived shortcomings of this model. Specifically, once seen as something other than 
an epiphenomenon, modern culture becomes a force whose relation to economy and 
politics must be theorized anew. Building on this account, John Guillory (2010, pp. 
353-62) has recently suggested that some of the divisions within Cultural Marxism can 
be traced back to the uptake of the mediation concept, and in particular, to the way 
that it impacted upon the project of ideology-critique.  
 For Frankfurt School theorists such as Theodor Adorno, ‘mediation’ became 
the name for a theoretical task that sought to wrest a possibility of change from the 
culture industry and its reified image of totality (see Arato 1982, pp. 199-204). But for 
those on the French New Left, such as Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard, the modern 
apparatus of cultural mediation had to be understood as nothing less than the basis for 
an entirely new order of historical truth – the real unreality of the spectacle, or the 
hyperrealism of the simulation machine. Standing Marx on his head, these theorists 
argued that the realm of appearance had effectively replaced that of production, 
giving rise to a ‘base-less’ regime of representation: ‘The spectacle is capital 
accumulated to the point where it becomes image’ (Debord 1994, p. 24); and yet at 
the same time, it is ‘in the sphere of the simulacra … that the global process of capital 
is founded’ (Baudrillard 1983, p. 99). With the advent of mass media, then, capitalism 
had been transformed into a grand tautology.  
For both Debord and Baudrillard, the most profound effect of this new 
circularity was its (apparent) annihilation of history. Debord, who still clung to Marx, 
described the spectacle as the beginning of a ‘paralyzed history’ (1994, p. 114) – i.e. 
one devoid of historical knowledge and consciousness, and thus condemned to an 
‘eternal present’ (1998, p. 12). Meanwhile, Baudrillard, having relinquished any such 
nostalgia, saw his ‘third-order simulacrum’ (1983, p. 105) as an exit from history 
altogether, declaring in no uncertain terms: ‘We come out of history in order to enter 
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into simulation’ (quoted in Chen 1987, p. 72). But despite this important difference, 
both suggest that historical process has given way to a strangely fluid stasis, and both 
attribute this development to a new systematic logic of representation. In so doing, 
they invite us to consider not simply the relation between media and the history of 
capitalism, but also that between mediated capitalism and the very (dis-) appearance 
of History. 
Within the context of contemporary global finance, this relation is played out 
in rather ambiguous terms. On the one hand, the age of derivatives and securitization 
has in many ways been an age without history. Finance in general has become a 
timeless media spectacle, figuring forth as ‘a never-ending series of daily stories’ and a 
‘cacophony of voices, images and events’ (Clark et al. 2004, p. 289). Meanwhile, new 
interactive media have exacerbated an already mimetic market rationality, turning 
financialized accumulation into a hyperreal loop of reflexive performance (Dean 
2010, pp. 4-14). Finally, in a twist that would make Baudrillard sick with pride, option 
pricing models – which themselves envisage an end to history in the form of a market-
completion fantasy (Wigan 2009) – have given rise to new and distinct worlds of 
practice (MacKenzie 2006); perhaps not an implosive absorption of the real by the 
code, but at the very least a bricolage that replaces history with a succession of 
equations.  
 And yet history refuses to disappear. Indeed, if it had ever been neutralised, 
obliterated, or concealed, then the most recent crisis has marked its reincorporation 
into the financial imaginary. The web-like markets for risk, the cascading automatism 
of their undoing, and the constant news bulletins about this very process – none of 
these have been able to repress what Gillian Tett (2007) has referred to as a sudden 
and ‘violent thirst for historical knowledge’. However, for the most part, this return of 
the past has bypassed the spectacular screens and cold models of financialized 
capitalism. Instead, it has emerged primarily through the commentary of its elites and 
its journalists, whose desperate attempts to produce a coherent narrative have 
involved employing a variety of historical analogies. In particular, financial 
newspapers and periodicals have been awash in references to the 1930s. When taken 
seriously, this development raises an interesting question about the nexus of 
capitalism, media, history and finance: What if the historicity of contemporary financial 
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capitalism is not simply something that is entangled with its own regime of representation, but also 
something that is potentially mediated by appeals to absent or quasi objects such as past crises?  
In pursuing this line of inquiry, I draw upon a neglected strand of philosophy 
known variously as ‘delicate’, ‘radical’ or ‘transcendental’ empiricism.1 Unlike its 
more familiar positivist namesake, this tradition takes the domain of the imagination 
to be the true seat of experiential knowledge, and fixes its focus on the imagined 
relations and unities that invest ‘raw’ sense data with meaning. Within the context of 
our problématique, this means focusing on exactly how financial journalists have 
invoked the Great Depression during the 2007-2009 period, and then using these 
practices as the basis for a reflexive reconstruction of historical theory. 
Rather than examining a wide range of publications, I proceed by 
systematically analyzing the output of ‘the global financial press’ – a methodological 
construct intended to capture the (re-) production of financial capitalism’s self-image. 
Concretely, this involves focusing on comment and opinion pieces in four well-known 
and widely circulated specialist publications: The Economist, The Financial Times (FT), 
Forbes Magazine, and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Although different from one another 
in many ways, each of these publications is based in a major international financial 
center and has syndication networks that target other hubs of high finance. They can 
therefore, when grasped together, be construed as a realm of appearance that is 
entirely specific to contemporary financialized capitalism. My wager is that by tracing 
how portrayals of the 1930s have evolved within this realm, we might gain an insight 
into the imaginary institution of historicity as such. 
THE RETURNS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
During the period of 2007-2009, the Great Depression does not simply return; it 
returns with vengeance. Within a corpus of 1,085 texts drawn from the four 
publications under study, the events of the 1930s are referred to in a total of 235 
separate articles.2 As the chart below illustrates, these references are more numerous 
and frequent following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and they 
reach their peak in the fourth quarter of that year. Moreover, the episode is quite 
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clearly taken-up by each of the four publications under study: the Economist invokes it 
on 80 separate occasions, the FT on 47, Forbes on 62, and the WSJ on 46. 
 
 
 
Figure 1  References to the 1930s in the global financial press 
 
Upon a close reading of these articles, it becomes clear that appeals to the 1930s have 
been remarkably varied in nature, touching on and in some cases speaking directly to 
a range of specific policy debates. However, many have also been accompanied by a 
suggestion that some particular set of conditions or events might recur – i.e. that history 
might repeat itself. Thus, in addition to the literal ‘return’ of the Great Depression to 
financial language and discourse, it is also possible to speak of a second more 
‘figurative’ return, wherein the 1930s are invoked in ways that envision its recurrence 
or repetition in some other present. 
Insofar as these visions of repetition take History as their referent, they 
effectively entangle the two moments of crisis in an aleatory understanding of 
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historical process. The ‘double return’ of the Great Depression can therefore be 
understood as a phenomenon that has returned the very idea of history to the 
financial imaginary, rendering it open to competing figurations. In the remainder of 
this section, I identify and discuss the emergence of three such figurations: (1) the crisis 
as a mere moment within a trans-historical business cycle; (2) the crisis as the second 
coming of a properly epochal turning point; and (3) the crisis as a moment of 
pendulum-like reversal in the relation between state and market.  
Again and again and again… 
To begin with, the 1930s are primarily used to support a cyclical reading of the 
emergent crisis. In mid-2007, for example, the Economist (2007) cites the response of 
American banker Leon Fraser to the 1929 crash: ‘Better to have loaned and lost than 
never to have loaned at all’. In so doing, it asserts the enduring reality of a business 
cycle, depicting the ongoing housing market correction as the latest installment in a 
long series of booms and busts. And then as fears of a painful correction mount, the 
FT comments on the increase in references to various other episodes within this series. 
Specifically, it observes that although ‘few pundits have attempted to suggest … a 
replay of the best-known drama of all – 1929’, a certain return of history is 
nevertheless underway: 
[T]he indifference towards the past is being replaced by a violent thirst for 
historical knowledge, as financiers reacquaint themselves with the 
unpalatable truth that almost every bubble is accompanied by a belief that 
innovation has changed the rules – a belief that typically proves to be false. 
(Tett 2007) 
Here we see 1929 invoked via reflexive counter-analogy rather than as part of a direct 
historical analogy, but the end result is the same: to present the ongoing crisis as 
fundamentally cyclical in nature. In the case of the Economist, 1929 is called upon to 
stand in for a more general type of recurrent crisis, whereas with the FT, its specificity 
is acknowledged but underwritten by an appeal to exactly the same kind of quasi-
natural economic cycles. Both also make more or less explicit assertions about the pro-
cyclical psychology of boom-and-bust. In this way, the crash of 1929 serves to 
emphasize the familiar and unavoidable aspects of the subprime meltdown, and 
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rather than an especially unique occurrence, repetition is itself portrayed as something 
that just happens – ‘again and again and again’. 
 This begins to change as the crisis deepens in early 2008. Following the rescue 
of Bear Stearns, some publications start drawing parallels with the 1930s as a specific 
and epochal crisis. First and foremost among these is the Economist, which identifies a 
string of similarities between the two episodes, focusing in particular on the scale of 
the asset bubble collapse (2008a), the extension of emergency support to an 
investment bank (2008b), and the rate of decline in US house prices (2008c). It even 
goes on to read this last factor as symptomatic of a failing American capitalism 
(2008d). Meanwhile, the FT takes up the IMF’s latest description of the crisis – ‘the 
largest financial shock since the Great Depression’ – and situates this alongside extant 
threats of (geo-) monetary disorder, announcing the arrival of an important ‘turning 
point’ in the management of the world economy (cited in Wolf 2008a). Rather than 
another in a long line of crises, then, the subprime meltdown is interpreted here as the 
potential return of a more virulent and historically significant strain of crisis. Certainty 
slides into speculation and repetition starts to take the form of an open question – 
‘again?’ 
Interestingly, this vision of repetition does not immediately take off and for 
some months it remains latent or at least counterbalanced by the readings offered by 
Forbes and the WSJ. For example, in early 2008, Forbes repeatedly rejects comparisons 
to the 1930s as overblown, suggesting that these comparisons are themselves the 
product of a cycle in investor sentiment: 
Gloomy people are saying that we are in the midst of the worst financial 
crisis since the 1930s. They said the same thing in 1998. Bullish! You can’t 
find a time in the 20th century when, less than five months into a real 
global bear market, people were talking bear market and recession in any 
visible numbers. But they always talk disaster during corrections. (Fisher 
2008) 
Both publications also set about debunking such comparisons via direct counter-
analogy. For the WSJ, another 1930s-style depression would require a return to the 
‘major policy blunders’ of that era, which it suggests have yet to prove forthcoming 
(Roche 2008); while for Forbes, the lack of protectionism and use of expansionary 
monetary policy already signal the existence of a different policy landscape to that of 
the 1930s (Malpass 2008a). The WSJ also focuses on key economic indicators, 
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pointing out that US mortgage delinquency rates are not nearly as high as they were 
in the 1930s, and both growth and employment figures not nearly as low (Berlau 
2008). This line of argument culminates in an article published by the WSJ at the 
peak of crisis, entitled ‘We’re Not Headed for a Depression’. Within it, author and 
Chicago economist Gary Becker (2008) explicitly dismisses suggestions of an epochal 
crisis, claiming that ‘the crisis that kills capitalism has been said to happen during 
every major recession and financial crisis ever since Karl Marx’. In this rather 
extreme view, history is in no danger of repeating itself because history is itself nothing 
more than a repetition of cyclical ups and downs. Indeed, the only real danger is that 
governments might fail to recognize this and respond to these cycles in misguided 
ways. 
Again? Never again! 
Although this reading of the crisis does not disappear entirely, the notion of benign 
repetition clearly gives way in late 2008 to fears about a new epochal crisis of 
capitalism. Rather than supporting cyclical readings of the 2007-2009 crisis, 
references to the 1930s now emphasize their status as a specific and properly historical 
episode, bringing the weight of its many consequences to bear on the present in the 
form of various imagined futures. This occurs through two distinct but interdependent 
practices of historical representation.  
First, there are analogies with the scale and scope of the Great Depression. As 
we have already seen, the Economist begins drawing these in mid-2008 following the 
bail-out of Bear Stearns, but after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in early 
September, the other three publications also join in and all four begin making 
numerous and frequent parallels with the 1930s. For instance, Forbes considers a 
massive consumer retrenchment in the US on a par with that of the 1930s (Shilling 
2008); and the WSJ focuses on the scale and persistence of US stock market losses, 
which it suggests are comparable only to those of December 1931 (Anon. 2008). 
Meanwhile, both the FT and the Economist emphasize the spread of the crisis beyond 
the confines of the US (Wolf 2008c; Economist 2008h); and the WSJ identifies a 
threat of ‘global stag-deflation’ that would see the macroeconomic dynamics of the 
Depression replayed on the world stage (Bremmer & Roubini 2009). In these ways, 
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analogies with the 1930s come to underline the potential significance of the emergent 
crisis, and the idea of historical repetition is well and truly transformed into a 
question. 
But in order for this question to be posed both in and to the present, the idea of 
epochal repetition must be invested with some kind of determinate content – exactly 
what might happen again? Accordingly, in addition to analogies of scale and scope, we 
also find a series of historical representations that focus on the causes and 
consequences of the Great Depression. Among these, those that concern issues of 
trade and political instability are particularly prominent. 
References to trade first emerge in mid-2007, when Forbes uses the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 to illustrate the self-defeating effects of protectionism (see 
Malpass 2007; and Forbes 2007b). These remain relatively isolated references until 
mid-2008, when both Forbes and the Economist begin applying this kind of lesson to 
various contemporary developments in trade policy, but it is not really until late 2008 
that publications begin bringing them to bear on the financial crisis. The earliest and 
most basic references of this sort simply assert the ongoing importance of keeping 
markets open: Forbes, for example, reiterates its claim that ‘The Depression was 
actually triggered by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff’ (Forbes 2008c); and the WSJ uses this 
same claim to underline the need to address stalled multilateral negotiations (Bush 
2008). Meanwhile, the Economist (2008g) relates it to resurgent debates over the future 
of Anglo-Saxon capitalism, insisting that ‘The free movement of non-financial goods 
and services should not be dragged into the argument – as they were, to disastrous 
effect, in the 1930s’. 
These references are soon supplemented by a range of subtle variations that 
relate the fear of a collapse in trade to different aspects of the crisis. The FT, for 
example, portrays global imbalances as a potential driver of protectionism, arguing 
that ‘if the surplus countries do not expand domestic demand relative to potential 
output, the open world economy may even break down’, adding, ‘as in the 1930s, this 
is now a real danger’ (Wolf 2008e; cf. 2009a and 2009b). The Economist (2008j) focuses 
instead on possible transmission mechanisms, pointing out that global supply chains 
‘could be disrupted by policies much less dramatic than the Smoot-Hawley Act’ (see 
also 2009d). And finally, both the Economist and Forbes counsel against any 
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complacency regarding a repeat of Smoot-Hawley, identifying proposed ‘Buy 
American’ provisions in the US stimulus package as an ominous harbinger of possible 
futures-to-come (see Economist 2009b; Forbes 2009a). In all of these instances, fear of 
repetition is explicitly invoked, and it is underwritten throughout by a shared 
conviction – namely, that we cannot afford to overlook the trade lessons of the 1930s. 
An exaggerated version of this process can be identified in references to war 
and political instability. Once again Forbes takes the lead, arguing that ‘the Great 
Depression made possible the rise of Nazism and the Second World War’ (Forbes 
2007a); but as the crisis deepens in late 2008, other publications begin to echo this 
reading of the 1930s in different ways. For example, while Forbes continues to restate 
its case, using the legacy of Nazism to warn against a turn away from free and open 
markets in the US (Forbes 2008c), the FT instead invokes ‘Hitler’s rise’ and ‘the 
horrors a depression might bring’ in order to urge Congress to rethink its rejection of 
Paulson’s rescue plan for the financial sector (Wolf 2008b). We will return to this point 
of tension in a later section. 
Another common trope is to identify shades of the 1930s on the geopolitical 
horizon. This first to do this is the WSJ, which maps the threat of instability onto the 
present by comparing the leaders of contemporary ‘rogue states’ to the ‘remorseless 
fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster’ during the Great Depression 
(Friedberg & Schoenfeld 2008). The FT performs a relatively similar maneuver in 
early 2009 when it characterizes the crisis as another ‘grave threat to world stability 
and democracy’, pointing out that ‘revolutions often start as bread riots’ (FT 2009). 
And finally Forbes too joins in, emphasizing the importance of an engaged and free-
trading US by casting Latin American populism as the new threat to liberal-
democratic capitalism:  
At that time [the 1930s] there was a region in play: Europe. A self-involved 
U.S. turned inward, allowing Mussolini and Hitler free rein. Today Latin 
America is in play, and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez is waiting in the wings, 
ready to fill the post-Castro vacuum. (Shlaes 2009a) 
In each of these instances, the specter of ‘another Great Depression’ takes the form of 
a potential slide into political instability and war. But as this last example clearly 
illustrates, this particular fear of repetition is in no way incompatible with that of 
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another collapse in trade. Rather, because trade functions within these representations 
as a cause and war as a consequence, the one fear of repetition in some cases already 
implies the other. That is to say, while some references to ‘another Great Depression’ 
do not necessarily emphasize trade, those that do draw their force from an implicit 
link between protectionism and some set of outcomes deemed worthy of averting. 
Thus, while Hitler may well seem a more objectionable figure than either Smoot or 
Hawley, ‘Hitler all over again’ is a more exaggerated fear even on purely formal-
logical terms, for it takes us to the next link in the causal chain. Nevertheless, with 
lessons of both trade and war, we see the same basic process at work: by inserting the 
Great Depression into a chain of causal relations and then transposing this chain into 
the present, cause and effect become scrambled, allowing the latter to negate the 
former via an injunction to avoid a repeat of the past – ‘never again!’ 
Repetition averted, repetition resumed… 
Unsurprisingly, these particular visions of repetition are not invoked with quite the 
same frequency once the crisis begins to abate in mid-2009. But rather than 
disappearing altogether, the idea of historical repetition persists and in fact continues 
to feature prominently in references to the 1930s. This is because the idea undergoes 
yet another process of change over the course of 2009. There are three specific 
developments worth highlighting here.   
 First, there is a shift away from the notion of imminent epochal repetition. 
This process can be traced as far back as late 2008, when all four publications start 
incorporating crisis-response measures into counter-analogies with the 1930s, but it is 
not really until early 2009 that these take off. Specifically, after the London G20 
Summit in April, both the Economist and the FT begin to regularly emphasize the scale 
and scope of the various measures enacted by policymakers, suggesting that these may 
have reduced the likelihood of another Great Depression. The Economist, for example, 
speaks of ‘the biggest and most synchronized macroeconomic stimulus since the 
Second World War’ (2009e), while the FT adds to this ‘the most far-reaching 
socialization of market risk in history’ (Wolf 2009c). Both publications do go on to use 
these same measures to express concerns about the need for exit strategies, but the 
basic point is still reiterated throughout the latter half of 2009. The Economist (2009h) 
  
14 
puts it succinctly: ‘It has become known as the Great Recession…But an equally apt 
name would be the Great Stabilisation’. ‘It’ of course is the crisis, which through sheer 
force of policy support is here seen as no longer worthy of its old epithet – ‘the next 
Great Depression’. 
 Second, there is the emergence of a new variation on the idea of epochal 
repetition. This can be observed in references to protectionism, which begin to take 
on a different form as fears of another Great Depression subside. We still find the 
occasional reference to trade collapse as a ‘really-existing’ threat, but on the whole 
these are pushed into the past tense where they instead name a threat that ‘really-
existed’ but has since been overcome. The Economist, for example, argues that 
although ‘trade has contracted by more in this crisis than it had at a comparable stage 
of the Depression … [there is] little doubt that the decline in trade has bottomed out’ 
(2009g). Meanwhile, even Forbes – which was the publication most critical of US trade 
policy – backs away from its earlier predictions of a return to the 1930s, claiming that 
‘[al]though Barack Obama is the most protectionist President since Herbert Hoover, 
we are not likely to pass another Depression-creating Smoot-Hawley-like tariff bill’ 
(Forbes 2009c). 
This same change is also evident in references to war and political stability. 
These become far less common in late 2009, but when Forbes and the FT do revisit the 
theme their discussion is inflected with a palpable sense of relief. For Forbes this rests 
primarily on what it sees as a lack of ‘credible alternatives to traditional democratic 
liberal values’, which it suggests has kept the ‘ghastly ideologies’ of the 1930s at bay 
(Forbes 2009b). However, in the case of the FT, this argument is incorporated into a 
much broader counter-analogy with the early 1900s: 
The good news is that the world has not made mistakes as big as those that 
followed the noughties a century ago: thanks, partly to nuclear weapons, 
direct conflicts among great powers have been avoided; a liberal world 
economy has survived, so far; the lessons of the 1930s were applied to the 
financial crisis of the 2000s, with at least short-run success … [and] While 
the movement towards democracy of the early 1990s has slowed, the 
number of grossly malign totalitarian regimes is now small, at least by the 
standards of the 20th century. (Wolf 2009d) 
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Here, against a similar geopolitical and ideological backdrop to the one depicted by 
Forbes, we also find two explanations being offered as to why the crisis was not as deep 
as the Great Depression – first, ‘the open liberal world economy has survived…’ and 
then second, ‘the lessons of the 1930s were applied…’. Each of these echoes the 
changes just observed in references to protectionism and crisis-response measures, but 
with respect to war the basic shift is the same as the one we see in Forbes. Specifically, 
the 1930s are used to illustrate how a threat to political stability was overcome, rather 
than to indicate the existence of any such threat in the present. 
Thus, in late 2009 we see a shift away from the idea of imminent repetition via 
general policy counter-analogies and more specific references to both trade and war. 
It is important to note, however, that what takes its place remains a vision of 
repetition, and that this new vision rests on a largely unchanged reading of the 1930s. 
With references to war, for example, there is agreement on what it is that might 
happen again – gulags, concentration camps, the end of the world etc. Meanwhile, 
with references to trade there appears to be agreement on how this might happen 
again, for a link between tariffs and the Great Depression is affirmed not only at the 
height of the perceived protectionist threat but also in its aftermath. The key 
difference, therefore, concerns when all of this might happen again. More precisely, 
then, what we see is a shift towards a vision in which repetition is latent rather than 
imminent.  
With this distinction in place we can now see the early references to trade and 
war that emerge in late 2007 as the beginning of a process through which visions of 
latent epochal repetition, based on hegemonic historical narratives, are called upon by 
actors in the global financial press and transformed into visions of imminent epochal 
repetition. Moreover, we can also understand the shift that occurs in late 2009 as a 
kind of becoming-latent, whereby fears of repetition are returned to the storehouse of 
History via counter-analogy and the use of past participles. And if we look back over 
the course of the crisis, we might now also observe that the idea of epochal repetition 
has moved through a series of different forms. 
Finally, there is a re-emergence of references to the 1930s that underpin a 
vision of cyclical repetition. As we have already seen, these were crowded out in late 
2008 when the crisis deepened and publications began turning to the idea of epochal 
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repetition, but they were never abandoned entirely. In fact, during the months 
following the Lehman bankruptcy, all four publications incorporate the 1930s into a 
contrarian and opportunistic reading of the business cycle on at least one occasion (cf. 
Dreman 2008; Economist 2008i; Wolf 2008d; and Stewart 2009a). In late 2009, 
however, both Forbes and the WSJ return to this theme, retroactively rejecting the idea 
of another Great Depression and announcing the arrival of a new bull market.  
In August, for example, Forbes dismisses recent stock market dips by identifying 
1935 as the only bull market that did not encounter ‘some material indigestion within 
its first twelve months’ (Fisher 2009). Meanwhile, the WSJ focuses instead on the bear 
market trough of 1932, pointing out that ‘investors who had the courage to invest 
realized handsome long-term gains’ (Stewart 2009b). In each of these instances, 
references to the Great Depression once again serve to emphasize the familiar and 
cyclical aspects of the now receding crisis. Thus, at the same time as we see a shift 
away from fears of imminent epochal repetition, we also see a parallel shift back 
towards the idea of natural cyclical repetition – the only difference is that this is now 
achieved by retrospectively identifying an inevitable upswing, rather than assessing the 
immediate prospect of another downturn.  
The rise of the state and/or the fall of capitalism 
The third and final vision of historical repetition to emerge during the crisis concerns 
the role of the capitalist state. As we have seen, while the idea of cyclical repetition is 
firmly rooted in a particular understanding of market dynamics, that of epochal 
repetition is based instead on a reading of how trade policy once threw democratic 
capitalism into crisis. But as various emergency measures are enacted in response to 
the prospect of another Great Depression, the very relation between state and market 
starts to figure as a subject of historical repetition. That is to say, portrayals of the 
1930s begin to reveal the ongoing crisis as a moment of pendulum-like reversal in the 
relation between state and market. Over the course of the crisis, however, individual 
publications come to take rather different views on the necessity and desirability of 
such a development. 
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The notion of historical reversal first appears in January 2008, when Forbes 
portrays the initial provision of relief to subprime borrowers as a turn for the worse in 
terms of policy orientation. Comparing this move to Hoover’s attempts to secure a 
voluntary freeze on redundancies and wage cuts in 1929, it suggests that the Treasury-
backed plan ‘follows bad precedents made during the Great Depression’ (Forbes 
2008a). It then continues in this vein as further crisis-response measures are enacted, 
casting both Hoover and Roosevelt as symbols of a more generic and recurrent form 
of misguided interventionism. In June, for example, it argues that the ‘myth’ of a 
passive Hoover and an activist Roosevelt is skewing US electoral debates, and that 
Obama’s proposed policies risk repeating their respective mistakes not only on trade 
but also on tax and bailouts (Forbes 2008b). It also reiterates this same point in early 
September, describing Obama as a dangerous ‘Hoover-FDR hybrid’ whose activism 
would leave ‘the punitive power of natural economic forces … deadened and 
restrained’ (Johnson 2008). Thus, as fears of epochal repetition mount, Forbes suggests 
that a cyclical downturn might indeed be transformed into another Great Depression, 
but only via a reversion to 1930s-style interventionism. The WSJ adopts a very similar 
position in response to the bailout of AIG, arguing that the risks of ‘socialized finance’ 
are clearly illustrated by ‘the record of the Depression-era Reconstruction Finance 
Corp.’, and that the only true route to recovery lies in a new bear market (Grant 
2008).  
 However, this nascent vision is soon inverted by both UK publications, which 
cast the initiatives of the US Treasury and Federal Reserve in a decidedly different 
light. The Economist, for example, explicitly rejects ‘predictions of a sea change towards 
more invasive government’, and argues that the deployment of public money should 
be seen as reducing the likelihood of a 1930s-style reversal: 
If Mr. Paulson and Mr. Bernanke have prevented a Depression-like 
collapse in output with their actions … then they may also have prevented 
a Depression-like backlash against the free market. (Economist 2008e) 
Meanwhile, the FT directly counters the position taken by Forbes on Hoover and 
Roosevelt, characterizing the US legislators who blocked Paulson’s Troubled Asset 
Relief Program as irresponsible liquidationists who ‘should realize that now is not a 
time for Hoovernomics’ (FT 2008a). Of course, neither publication denies that a 
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‘redrawing [of] the boundaries between government and markets’ is underway, and 
both acknowledge that precisely such a redrawing followed the Depression (Economist 
2008f; see also FT 2008b). The point, however, is that they do not interpret state 
rescues as another turn away from markets. Instead, they see them as the proper 
response to a recurring paradox: sometimes, bank failure means that government has 
no choice but to ‘Nationalise [in order] to save the free market’ (FT 2008b). 
 As the crisis continues to deepen, Forbes and the WSJ slightly soften their views 
on the need for government intervention. Forbes, for example, concedes that 
‘emergency measures may have been necessary’, but still worries that these could 
create Washington’s ‘biggest power expansion since the New Deal’ (Malpass 2008b). 
Similarly, the WSJ accepts that in exceptional circumstances, ‘radical government 
policies should be considered’, but continues to argue that ‘many … including several 
pursued by Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression … can make things 
worse’ (Barro 2009). However, once fears of epochal repetition give way to extensive 
international cooperation, both return to a more unambiguous stance. For example, 
following the London meeting of the G20, the WSJ uses the 1930s to diagnose an 
ongoing and global process of historical reversal: 
The Depression put in motion an historic tension between public and 
private sectors ... After 50 years of public dominance, Reagan’s presidency 
tipped the scales back toward private enterprise ... [but for] Every waking 
hour of this economically liberal era, the losing side has wanted to tip the 
balance back ... The opportunity to achieve that goal finally arrived --- 
with the Great Recession of 2009. (Henninger 2009) 
Here, the Great Depression is portrayed not simply as an event that might repeat 
itself, but also as the origin of a tug-of-war between statist and pro-market forces.  
Moreover, within this particular figuration, the crisis is revealed as an event through 
which statists are seeking to repeat the reversal they achieved in the 1930s. Forbes 
performs a similar move in late 2009 when it once again compares current US policy 
to the New Deal, and then describes the latter as ‘a decade of contest between an 
ambitious public sector and a dazed private sector’ (Shlaes 2009b). In this way, for 
Forbes and the WSJ, visions of epochal repetition mutate into explicit fears about 
another reversal in the relation between states and markets.  
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 Interestingly, although both the Economist and the FT do start to identify some 
risks associated with new state powers and responsibilities, neither comes to question 
the necessity of their introduction in relation to the crisis of finance (cf. Economist 
2009f; and Wolf 2009d). The idea of a ‘reversal’, therefore, continues to figure as a 
recurrent danger that accompanies state inaction, but now also serves to designate an 
outcome that has been averted via timely intervention. In other words, for the UK-
based publications, governments have helped saved financial capitalism from itself. 
This stands in stark contrast to the pronouncements of the US-based publications, 
which essentially suggest that if capitalism has survived the crisis, this has been in spite 
of misguided public actions, which now threaten to stifle the true private sources of 
recovery. Thus, for the first time, we actually find diametrically opposed 
representations of the 1930s being refracted through the same basic notion of 
repetition, producing a split within the global financial press on the future of capitalist 
state. 
MAKING HISTORY (DIS-) APPEAR 
During the peak of the crisis in late 2008, the Economist began one of its article sections 
by inviting readers to view ‘Smoot-Hawley in the rear mirror’ (2008g). In effect, it 
sought to use a simple visual metaphor in order to bring the 1930s into the present 
and emphasize the dangers of protectionism. In order to capture how representations 
of the 1930s have shaped the appearance of the recent crisis, let us now employ a 
visual metaphor of our own. Specifically, let us imagine that the idea of the Great 
Depression has functioned as if it were itself a kind of mirror. 
During the age of the Picturesque in the late 18th century, landscape painters 
all across Europe used small black convex mirrors to reduce and unify the objects of 
nature under their gaze. Upon walks they would quite literally stop, turn their back on 
the scene that interested them, and look instead into their mirror, adjusting their 
position until they were confronted with an image they deemed beautiful enough to 
paint (see Maillet 2004, pp. 85-101).  In much the same way, during the recent crisis, 
no financial journalist has seemed willing to wander far without an idea of the Great 
Depression at the ready, convinced that only these will enable them to bring the 
‘whole’ of the present into view and deliver History over to language. Thus, at each 
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and every stage of the crisis, we find publications turning to the 1930s in order to 
depict historical process.   
Of course, we also find a range of different Great Depressions being invoked. 
But rather than there being a stable relation between a specific publication and any 
one of these Great Depressions, what we find instead is that historical representations 
and images of the historical present co-evolve in ways that differ slightly from 
publication to publication. In order to capture the logic of this process, we might 
recall a specific variety of black mirror known as the Claude Lorraine Glass. Rather 
than a single mirror, the Claude Lorraine Glass describes a portable set of convex 
tinted lenses that tourists carried with them on walks through the countryside.  Upon 
encountering a compelling scene, these walkers would experiment by looking at it 
through any one of their different colored lenses, allowing them to ‘modify the 
weather and the luminosity of a day or a season in the space of a few seconds’ (Maillet 
2004, p. 142). With Claude Glasses, then, one’s physical position and chosen lens 
interact to reveal the ‘truth’ of Nature, but they also shape the way this truth appears 
in the present. With the idea of the Great Depression, conjuncture and historical 
representation interact to produce an image of History in much the same way. While in late 
2007 and late 2009, 1929 and 1932 serve to render the crisis as a mere moment 
within a trans-historical business cycle, in late 2008 and early 2009, 1930 and 1939 
instead present it as a properly epochal turning point. Meanwhile, from late 2008 
onwards, the policies of Hoover and Roosevelt serve to produce two different images 
of reversal in the relation between state and market. By way of summary, we might 
say that the 1930s are repeatedly invoked in ways that purport to reveal the historicity of the 2007-
2009 crisis, and that these representations of the 1930s interact with the unfolding crisis to produce 
different interpretations of its historicity.  
In a paradoxical twist, then, recent appeals to 1930s do not attest to a simple 
disclosure or concealment of history. Instead, by acting as a kind of historical black 
mirror, the idea of the Great Depression has simultaneously performed both of these 
functions. Competing portrayals of the 1930s have served to bring specific histories 
into view, but by doing so they have also obscured other possible figurations that 
would reveal different truths about the unfolding present. In theoretical terms, this 
process implies a new and interesting relation between the crises of financial history 
and the histories of financial crisis. Specifically, within the context of contemporary 
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mediated capitalism, it would seem that by bringing past events into the interpretive 
orbit of the present, a financial crisis can be transformed into a full-blown crisis of 
historical consciousness. Moreover, within such a moment of confusion, these very 
same historical representations can be deployed as part of an attempt to put capitalist 
history back together again. To quote Valéry once more: ‘History feeds upon history’ 
(1951, p. 13). 
However, this loop is fundamentally different to the kinds of oppressive 
tautologies that were theorized by the French New Left. For Debord, the ‘real’ of 
history somehow feeds on bad or corrupted historical imagery, leaving itself bloated, 
sick and unable to go on. Meanwhile, for Baudrillard, history enters into a carnival of 
metaphysical cannibalism, eating so much of itself that auto-referentiality is all that 
remains. But within the logic of the historical black mirror, it is the historicity of the 
present that feeds upon representations of the past, and it does this precisely in order 
to recognize itself. Moreover, it seeks this recognition so that it may remain within 
History, and will rewrite the very logic of historical process if this is the price it must 
pay. Thus, it is not simply the self-image of the historical present that is entangled with 
its own regime of representation, but also the ‘actual’ historicity of said present, which 
is indistinguishable from its appearance as a figuration. In other words, by acting as a 
privileged mediator between the historical present and visions of historical repetition, 
the idea of the Great Depression has effectively served to reveal the fundamentally 
constitutive relation of historical imagination to historical process. Hence, in place of 
Debord’s ‘false consciousness of time’ (1994, p. 114), we should speak instead of the 
necessary fictions of historical process, and within Baudrillard’s destruction of history 
by virtualization, we should identify the preconditions for a new mode of its very 
production.  
This production of history, however, is clearly a process whose results are 
indeterminate. Over the course of the recent crisis, this is forcefully illustrated not only 
by the way in which the Great Depression has given rise to different visions of 
historical repetition, but also in how these visions have impacted upon the discursive 
negotiation of the crisis. Within the coverage of the global financial press, we have 
seen denial slip into a state of emergency as visions of cyclical repetition give way to 
fears of epochal repetition; we have seen the notion of historical reversal emerge and 
take shape alongside state initiatives that are expressly intended to prevent cyclical 
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repetition from sliding into epochal repetition; and we have seen visions of cyclical 
repetition re-emerge and support a return to business-as-usual. In these ways, visions 
of repetition would appear to have helped save financial capitalism from itself, 
securing the conditions for its ongoing reproduction both during and in the wake of 
the recent crisis.  
But at the same time, we have also seen a split emerge within the global 
financial press. Specifically, through the notion of historical reversal, we have seen 
UK and US publications adopt diametrically opposed positions on the necessity and 
desirability of emergency crisis-response measures. For the former, these measures are 
precisely what have prevented a return to the 1930s, whereas for the latter, they are 
the only remaining threat of any such return. Insofar as this disagreement concerns 
both the historicity of the crisis and the future of the capitalist state, it constitutes an 
important new fissure within contemporary financial capitalism: no longer is there 
agreement on what kind of crisis it has experienced, and no longer is there agreement 
on the proper role of the state within financialized accumulation. Thus, while 
portrayals of the 1930s may have initially helped to weather the crisis, they have also 
served to undermine the ability of financial capitalism to produce a coherent self-
image. The outcome of this new precarity is still uncertain. What is clear, however, is 
that it will depend on whether the commentariat of global finance can once again 
establish a shared vision of capitalist history.  
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NOTES 
                                                        
1
 These are the terms employed by J. W. von Goethe, William James and Gilles 
Deleuze respectively. Brian Massumi (2000) has recently called for an ‘expanded 
empiricism’ that would incorporate each of these thinkers’ insights, while Angus 
Cameron and Ronen Palan (2009) have used Deleuze’s early work to sketch-out a 
strategy of ‘post-structural empiricism’. 
2
 This corpus consists of comment or opinion pieces that meet two criteria: (1) they 
address ongoing financial turmoil; and (2) they are published in native print editions 
between January 2007 and December 2009. For each publication, the aggregate count 
and list of relevant article sub-categories are as follows: Economist (273) – ‘Leaders’, 
‘Special Reports’, and ‘Briefings’; FT (385) – ‘Editorial Comment’ and ‘Columns’; 
Forbes (194) – ‘Fact & Comment’, ‘Current Events’, and ‘Columns’; and WSJ (234) 
– ‘Editorial’ and ‘Commentary’. 
 
